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Essay 
A Tale of Two Searches:  Intrusive Civil Discovery 
Rules Violate the Fourth Amendment 
CHAD DEVEAUX 
In this Essay, I argue that civil discovery rules compelling the 
production of private papers violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches.  A “search” occurs 
when a government agent intrudes upon a sphere in which society 
recognizes “a reasonable expectation of privacy.”  Implicit in this 
definition is an affinity for private papers such as letters and diaries.  
Creators of such media possess a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their contents.  Thus, when police seek to examine such documents 
to look for evidence of crime, they usually must obtain a search 
warrant.  For the warrant to issue, the police must establish 
probable cause.  Conversely, under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and parallel state provisions, all a litigant needs to do to 
“unlock the doors of discovery” is file a complaint endowed with 
“well-pleaded factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief.”  When this modest obligation is met, the 
Federal Rules direct courts to compel the production of any papers 
sought that are “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”  No 
detail is too intimate to shield it from scrutiny.  Courts even 
routinely order the production of personal diaries.  I assert that to 
pass constitutional muster such orders, like search warrants, must 
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A Tale of Two Searches:  Intrusive Civil Discovery 
Rules Violate the Fourth Amendment 
CHAD DEVEAUX* 
“[T]he power for the most massive invasion into private 
papers and private information is available to anyone willing 
to take the trouble to file a civil complaint.  A foreigner 
watching the discovery proceedings in a civil suit would 
never suspect that this country has a highly-prized tradition 
of privacy enshrined in the fourth amendment.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A common cultural trope posits that just societies invariably 
promulgate a set of foundational premises prefaced by a benevolent “rule 
number one.”2  This rule embodies the Volksgeist of the community.3  It 
establishes the benchmark the society uses to judge its leaders.  Rule 
number one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and parallel 
state provisions charge the judiciary with “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”4  By every 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, Concordia University School of Law; LL.M., 
Harvard Law School; J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School.  I am gratefully indebted to my 
student, Craig Cannon, who suggested the title for this Essay.  I also thank Professors Andy Kim, Jack 
McMahon, and Joe Tomain for providing thoughtful comments on earlier drafts.  Finally, I thank Kerry 
Lohmeier and Anne Mostad-Jensen of Concordia’s Law Library for their invaluable assistance 
researching this Essay, and the editors and staff of the Connecticut Law Review for their hard work 
preparing it for publication.  Any mistakes are mine. 
1 Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107 (1976). 
2 See, e.g., Matthew 22:34–40 (New American Bible) (“You shall love the Lord, your God with 
all thy heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind.  This is the greatest and the first 
commandment.  The second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself.  The whole law and the 
prophets depend on these two commandments.”). 
3 The Volksgeist is “the historically developed legal consciousness of a particular people.”  Arthur 
E. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOWA L. REV. 389, 398 (1964). 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  While I refer to the FRCP throughout this Essay, my critiques are equally 
directed at the states and the District of Columbia, as the overwhelming majority of American 
jurisdictions have codified the FRCP virtually verbatim, including Rule 1.  See ALA. R. CIV. P. 1 
(construing rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”); 
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding”); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action”); ARK. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”); CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 1.5 (construing rules 
“liberally . . . to ensure the just and speedy determination of the proceedings that they govern”); 
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objective measure, our courts have fallen spectacularly short of this goal.5 
Several factors contribute to public dissatisfaction with our courts, 
including docket congestion,6 legislative underfunding,7 and the inefficient 
                                                                                                                          
COLO. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “liberally . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action”); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding”); D.C. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 (same); 
HAW. R. CIV. P. 1 (same); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “liberally . . . to secure the just, speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”); IND. R. TRIAL PROC. R. 1 (construing 
rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-102 (West 2010) (construing rules “liberally . . . to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding”); MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”); MISS. R. CIV. P. 1 (same); MONT. R. CIV. P. 1 
(construing rules to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding”); NEB. CT. R. PLDG. § 6-1101; NEV. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”); N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-001 (construing rules “to 
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”); N.D. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing 
rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”); 
OHIO R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules to “eliminat[e] delay, unnecessary expense and all other 
impediments to . . . justice”); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action”); S.C. R. CIV. P. 1 (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 15-6-1 
(construing rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”); 
TENN. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 1 (calling for rules “to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial 
adjudication . . . . [w]ith as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense”); UTAH R. CIV. P. 1 
(construing rules “liberally . . . to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action”); VT. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action”); WASH. CIV. R. 1 (same); W.V. R. CIV. P. 1 (same); WYO. R. CIV. P. 1 (same). 
5 See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, All Right, Retired Judges, Write!, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 227, 
233 (2006) (lamenting the FRCP’s failure “to live up to their promise to deliver a ‘just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action’” ” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)); Lindsey D. Blanchard, Rule 
37(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”: More Bark than Bite, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 131 (2011) (arguing 
that courts’ systemic failure to impose sanctions for litigation misconduct “undermines the very reason 
for the Federal Rules’ existence—‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)); E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of 
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 310 (1986) (noting criticism that the FRCP have failed “to achieve 
[their] self-proclaimed goal of ‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of controversies” 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1040 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court failed in interpreting the FRCP by not reading them actively in light of Rule 1). 
6 See, e.g., Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs Some Grease: Designing 
the Federal Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–3 (1997) (documenting 
vast increases in federal appellate congestion, pondering its causes, and noting its deleterious effects); 
Rifkind, supra note 1, at 98 (stating that courts’ caseloads are “increasing at a pace far beyond the 
growth in population”). 
7 See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger, Do We Have 18th Century Courts for the 21st Century?, 100 KY. 
L.J. 833, 833 (2012) (calling the court-funding crisis “potentially devastating” and a “crisis in a stream 
of crises”); Paul J. De Muniz, The Invisible Branch: Funding Resilient Courts Through Public 
Relations, Institutional Identity, and a Place on the “Public Radar,” 100 KY. L.J. 807, 807 (2012) 
(“State courts . . . are struggling under prolonged budget cuts severe enough to jeopardize judicial 
infrastructure and constitutional democracy.”).  
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allocation of judicial resources.8  But the primary impediment to the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of disputes lies in the FRCP’s 
expansive discovery devices or, more precisely, in their abuse.9  Discovery, 
as any experienced litigator can profess, “is war,”10 and not just any war, 
mind you.  Discovery is a “war of attrition.”11 
Originally conceived as a shield against obfuscation,12 the FRCP’s 
expansive discovery devices have become “a weapon capable of imposing 
large and unjustifiable costs on one’s adversary”13 and a tool enabling 
unethical litigants to “stonewall[] for no purpose other than to 
deplete . . . resources and enlarge . . . billable time.”14 
Scholarly criticism of the modern discovery regime is legion.  
Commentators have sacrificed untold forests lamenting its economic 
costs.15  But comparatively little ink has been spilled exploring the 
extensive invasion of personal privacy entailed by the reach of 
contemporary document production rules.16  As the late federal judge 
                                                                                                                          
8 See, e.g., Carlton, supra note 6, at 3–9 (describing the dearth of specialized courts, glut caused 
by statutory appeals, underemployment of alternative-resolution procedures, lack of “jumbo” courts of 
appeals, and outmoded appellate opinions as the key culprits in judicial inefficiency); Rifkind, supra 
note 1, at 105 (arguing that probate courts are a waste of judicial resources, as much of the work is 
uncontested).   
9 See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (decrying a “significant 
potential for abuse” given the “liberality of pretrial discovery”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as 
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636 (1989) (providing data on the widespread recognition of discovery 
problems by federal judges); Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 357, 365 (2006) (noting that in the American scheme, parties, rather than courts, 
have primary control over discovery); Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order 
Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (noting that the promulgation of the FRCP massively 
dilated the scope of discovery); Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and 
Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) (noting that “American federal discovery provides for 
more liberal discovery than any other legal system in the world”); Rifkind, supra note 1, at 107 (calling 
the discovery process “an endurance contest” that proceeds without “serious regulation”); John K. 
Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and 
Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 579–86 (1989) (using a protracted examination of game theory 
to show that abusive “impositional” requests will proliferate under the FRCP); see also Russell J. 
Weintraub, Critique of the Hazard-Taruffo Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
413, 420 (1998) (noting that disapproval of U.S. discovery practices extends internationally). 
10 Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 635; accord Setear, supra note 9, at 579.   
11 Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 635.   
12 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500–01 (1947) (comparing the illuminating effects of the 
discovery rules to the opacity present under the prior federal procedures).   
13 Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 636.   
14 Douglas M. Branson, Book Review, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 459, 460 (1998). 
15 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 636 (remarking that “[l]itigants with weak cases 
have . . . every reason to heap costs on” their opposition to coerce settlement “on favorable terms”); id. 
at 637 (“The party in a position to threaten exhaustive discovery can claim for itself in settlement a 
portion of the costs that should not have been imposed in the first place.”). 
16 But see Jordana Cooper, Beyond Judicial Discretion: Toward a Rights-Based Theory of Civil 
Discovery and Protective Orders, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 775, 808 (2005) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
mandates that discovery not be ordered where the basic element of relevancy is lacking.”); Rifkind, 
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Simon Rifkind observed, “[T]he power for the most massive invasion into 
private papers and private information is available to anyone willing to 
take the trouble to file a civil complaint.”17   
This expansive power stands in sharp contrast with that afforded to law 
enforcement.  As Justice Brandeis famously observed: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They 
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy 
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.18 
When it comes to matters of personal privacy, ours is both an “age of 
wisdom” and an “age of foolishness.”19  In the context of criminal 
investigations—where public interest in ascertaining the truth is the 
highest20—twentieth-century courts became zealous defenders of the right 
to be let alone.21  Yet during the same period, they wholly eviscerated the 
right to privacy in civil litigation.22  In the civil arena nothing is sacred, no 
detail too intimate to shield it from scrutiny.  For example, “courts . . . have 
routinely ordered the production of personal diaries in response to requests 
                                                                                                                          
supra note 1, at 107 (arguing that document production orders facilitate unreasonable invasions of 
privacy); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984) (“[D]iscovery . . . may 
seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties.”). 
17 Rifkind, supra note 1, at 107. 
18 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 n.10 (1972) (quoting Justice Brandeis’s text approvingly); Katz, 
389 U.S. at 350 (finding that the Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds 
of governmental intrusion”). 
19 CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 5 (Richard Maxwell ed., Penguin Books 2000) 
(1859). 
20 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 
(2006) (“The [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs,’ which 
sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.” (citation omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))). 
21 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“[The Fourth] Amendment protects individual privacy against 
certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”).  But see David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless Poisonous Trees in a 
Parallel Universe: Hudson v. Michigan, Knock-and-Announce, and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 659, 698–99 (2007) (arguing that the Roberts Court has deliberately eroded some Fourth 
Amendment protections recognized in the latter half of the twentieth century). 
22 See Rifkind, supra note 1, at 107 (explaining how civil litigation undermines personal privacy).  
The Rules Enabling Act empowers the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules of practice and 
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings 
before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).  Utilizing this 
power, the Court promulgated the FRCP in 1938.  Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th 
Cir. 2002).  
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for production of documents.”23  Worse, many courts recognize a 
“presumption that discovery materials . . . are open to public inspection,” 
and permit the dissemination of such information to the media.24 
This discontinuity in matters of personal privacy represents more than 
just a curious paradox to be explored by academics.25  It violates the 
Constitution.  The Fourth Amendment explicitly protects “papers” from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”26  At the beating heart of the Fourth 
Amendment lies a fundamental respect for the “dignity, and security of 
persons.”27  To that end, the Amendment limits the ability of government 
agents to make intrusions into “sphere[s] in which society recognizes 
reasonable expectations of privacy.”28  Informed by both “historical 
                                                                                                                          
23 Gill v. Beaver, No. CIV. A. 98-3569, 1999 WL 461821, at *1 (E.D. La. July 2, 1999); see, e.g., 
Hawkins v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 07-142-DRH-CJP, 2008 WL 4279994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2008) 
(ordering production of diary to reveal plaintiff’s “most private thoughts and feelings”); Zakrzewska v. 
New Sch., No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008) (allowing 
discovery of diary to undermine expert witness testimony); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 
360–62 (D. Colo. 2004) (requiring production of thirty-four enumerated diary passages over plaintiff’s 
objections to support plaintiff’s prior voluntary diary submissions), rev’d on other grounds, 500 F.3d 
1170 (10th Cir. 2007); Quiroz v. Hartgrove Hosp., No. 97 C 6515, 1998 WL 341812, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. 
June 12, 1998) (mandating six specific diary disclosures relevant to dispute); Topol v. Trs. of the Univ. 
of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (allowing discovery of diary when “undue annoyance, 
embarrassment, and oppression” was unlikely due to a confidentiality stipulation); Dogan Enters., Inc. 
v. Hubsher, No. CV-84-3984, 1987 WL 20312, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1987) (ordering diary 
production in an accounting case); Eidukonis v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 86-5142, 1987 WL 9286, at 
*2–3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1987) (ordering production when diarist failed to stress personal nature of 
diary); Zises v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 112 F.R.D. 223, 224–25, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing a 
plaintiff’s claim after a refusal to produce diaries); In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 
616, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (allowing possibility of diary production after in-camera review); Chang-
Craft v. Cameron, No. 3AN-05-13737 CI, 2006 WL 6886441, at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2006) 
(ordering production of a diary but limiting scope of inspection); Robinson v. Robinson, 764 N.Y.S.2d 
93, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (allowing admission of a diary obtained by improper means when party 
“would have been entitled to its production”); Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 741 N.Y.S.2d 369, 369 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (remanding with order for in-camera review of a diary by lower court); 
Hollingworth v. Hollingworth, 145 P.2d 466, 466–67 (Ore. 1944) (using a diary to indict defendant’s 
“loose morals and overindulgence in alcohol”). 
24 Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 F.R.D. 29, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Flaherty v. Seroussi, 209 F.R.D. 
295, 297–99 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Hawley v. Hall, 131 F.R.D. 578, 581 (D. Nev. 1990). 
25 The discontinuity may stem from the fact that “the literatures of criminal procedure and 
constitutional law do not speak to one another, and the cases do not cite each other.”  William J. Stuntz, 
Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1016–17 (1995) 
(footnote omitted). 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
27 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613 (1989). 
28 United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 1991); see California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person 
has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (“[T]here is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
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practices”29 and prevailing “social norms,”30 the Fourth Amendment 
embodies a particularly deep respect for the high expectation of privacy 
inherent in private papers.31  For this reason, the Fourth Amendment’s text 
accords “papers” special protection.32 
Yet civil litigants seeking access to an opponent’s private papers face 
little scrutiny.  Judge Rifkind imagined that “[a] foreigner watching the 
discovery proceedings in a civil suit would never suspect that this country 
has a highly-prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the fourth 
amendment.”33  The FRCP empowers litigants to demand the production of 
private papers from opponents—and even third parties—virtually as a 
matter of right.34  As Justice Murphy noted, bestowing a private party with 
the power “to demand the books and papers of an individual is an open 
invitation to abuse that power.”35   
In this Essay, I argue that the judicially compelled production of one’s 
private papers constitutes a quintessential Fourth Amendment search.  I 
assert that to pass constitutional muster, document production orders 
seeking private papers should be premised on a showing of probable cause: 
a showing by the moving party that “there is a fair probability” that the 
papers sought will yield admissible evidence.36  In determining whether the 
movant has satisfied her burden, courts should independently evaluate the 
allegations offered, probing “the veracity, reliability, and basis of 
knowledge” of the source.37  Allegations premised upon the naked surmise 
                                                                                                                          
29 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to 
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas . . . it enumerates.”). 
30 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters . . . are in the general 
class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy . . . .”); United States 
v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D.D.C. 1981) (“[P]risoners ‘have and should have’ a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of a personal diary.” (quoting Diguiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 
503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d in part, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983))); James A. McKenna, The 
Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. 
L.J. 55, 68 (1978) (arguing that private papers “should occupy a type of preferred position” under the 
Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Email is 
the technological scion of tangible mail . . . . [and] requires strong protection under the Fourth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
33 Rifkind, supra note 1, at 107. 
34 See Erichson, supra note 9, at 365 (“What is extraordinary about United States discovery . . . is 
not only its breadth, but also the extent to which it is controlled by the parties rather than the court.”). 
35 Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 219 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
36 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
37 United States v. Archibald, 685 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., United States v. Hodge, 
354 F.3d 305, 309 (4th Cir. 2004) (considering the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons who 
supplied information that formed the basis for a search warrant affidavit); United States v. Davis, 313 
F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (evaluating the validity of a search warrant affidavit based on an 
“informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge,” among other factors). 
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of “information and belief” will not suffice.38 
This Essay continues with four Parts.  Part II explores the Supreme 
Court’s evolving conception of what constitutes a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  I assert that the compelled production of private 
papers, such as diaries, letters, and e-mails, constitutes a search because the 
authors of such documents possess a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
in their contents.39 
Part III addresses the level of scrutiny required to render the search of 
private papers reasonable.  I argue that the limitations imposed by the 
FRCP are insufficient because they do not require a showing of probable 
cause—the standard which provides the ordinary measure of 
reasonableness for Fourth Amendment purposes.40 
Part IV explores how the Supreme Court’s probable-cause 
jurisprudence, developed for the issuance of search warrants, may be 
tailored to fit the field of pre-trial discovery.  I contend that a litigant 
seeking the production of private papers—like a constable seeking a search 
warrant—should bear the burden of establishing that “there is a fair 
probability” that the documents sought will yield admissible evidence.41  
While far more burdensome than the FRCP’s current regime, probable 
cause is “a standard well short of absolute certainty” that a majority of 
litigants will be able to satisfy.42  This standard will prevent current abuses 
because its satisfaction requires litigants to identify the basis of their 
knowledge.43  Allegations premised on information and belief will not 
suffice.   
Finally, Part V argues that when the compelled disclosure of private 
papers is deemed reasonable, courts should issue protective orders 
preventing the public disclosure of information obtained that is not 
admitted into evidence.44  Litigants will inevitably “obtain—incidentally or 
purposefully—information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly 
                                                                                                                          
38 See Schencks v. United States, 2 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (noting that “information and 
belief” allegations fall short of demonstrating “probable cause”); Carden v. Ensminger, 161 N.E. 137, 
141 (Ill. 1928) (same). 
39 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (acknowledging that the determination of 
whether a search occurred must, by necessity, turn on whether a person had a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” in regard to the subject matter of the search). 
40 Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013). 
41 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39. 
42 Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007) (per curiam). 
43 United States v. Archibald, 685 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. McClellan, 165 
F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1996). 
44 The First Amendment requires that private papers actually received into evidence be made 
available to the public.  See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586–88 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (asserting that the First Amendment prohibits judicial restraints on media coverage of 
trials). 
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released could be damaging to reputation and privacy.”45  When based on a 
showing of probable cause, such intrusions are justified by the judicial 
system’s “interest in determination of truth.”46  But I assert that the 
humiliation caused by such intrusions should not be amplified by allowing 
unnecessary exposure of the private information. 
II.  CIVIL DOCUMENT PRODUCTION ORDERS CONSTITUTE “SEARCHES” 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment’s ambit is limited to searches and seizures, 
“legal term[s] of art whose history is riddled with complexity.”47  Further, 
the Amendment “proscrib[es] only governmental action; it is wholly 
inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by 
a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the 
participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’”48  Thus, my 
thesis is premised upon the threshold conclusions that the court-ordered 
production of private papers constitutes “governmental action” and that 
such action amounts to a search or seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
A.   The Court-Ordered Production of Documents Constitutes 
Governmental Action 
The Supreme Court recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan49 
that the Bill of Rights applies with equal vigor to legislative and judicial 
action.50  In Sullivan, the respondent argued that the First Amendment was 
inapplicable to a common law defamation action between private parties 
because the Amendment “is directed against [governmental] action and not 
private action.”51  The Court rejected this contention: 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the 
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which 
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their 
                                                                                                                          
45 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984). 
46 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976). 
47 Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001)); see Walsh v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 4586(NRB), 2001 WL 
83221, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001) (noting that “what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ search or seizure for 
Fourth Amendment purposes is often a complex question that has led to voluminous case law”). 
48 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 
649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
49 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
50 Id. at 291–92; see also Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1217 (9th Cir. 2003) (“State power 
may be exercised as much by a . . . judge’s . . . application of a state rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by 
a statute.” (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996))). 
51 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265. 
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constitutional freedoms . . . . It matters not that that law has 
been applied in a civil action . . . . The test is not the form in 
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, 
whether such power has in fact been exercised.52 
Civil discovery orders are no different.  Discovery is the “coerced 
production of information”53 and it is backed by the full coercive power of 
the State.  “If a litigant fails to comply with an appropriate discovery 
request, the Court may have to interject itself and order compliance, 
enforceable by the court’s contempt powers.  Thus, there is government 
compulsion involved.”54  As such, document production orders constitute a 
form of governmental action implicating the Constitution.  But the 
question remains whether the government conduct involved constitutes a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.55 
B.  The Compelled Production of Private Papers Falls Within the Supreme 
Court’s Definition of “Search” 
1. Nineteenth-Century Precedent Recognized that Document 
Production Orders Constitute Fourth Amendment Searches 
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was bound by the shackles of property law.  Modern notions 
of privacy were foreign to criminal procedure.56  A “search” simply meant 
“a quest by an officer of the law” for property and a “seizure” was “a 
forcible dispossession of” that property from its possessor by the 
government.57   
Implicit in this property-centric view of searches and seizures was a 
limitation quite foreign to modern jurists.  Case law of this era recognized 
                                                                                                                          
52 Id. (citing Ex parte Virgina, 100 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1880)). 
53 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1984). 
54 Hawkins v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 07-142-DRH-CJP, 2008 WL 4279994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 
2008) (citing Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 30). 
55 Because document production usually involves the production of duplicates, the Fourth 
Amendment’s seizure clause is not ordinarily implicated.  But see Cooper, supra note 16, at 789–806 
(arguing that the coerced production of documents constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking). 
56 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was 
tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (noting that nineteenth-century Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was rooted in 
property rights, not privacy). 
57 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).  Until the mid-twentieth-century, the Supreme Court 
defined a Fourth Amendment search as a common-law trespass committed by a government actor upon 
one’s “person, . . . house, . . . papers or . . . effects.”  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 
(1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 
(1967).  The Supreme Court recently recognized that such trespasses—along with certain invasions of 
privacy—still constitute Fourth Amendment “searches.”  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52 (noting that 
the modern “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test” for whether a search has occurred “has been 
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”). 
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a:  
[D]istinction between merely evidentiary materials, on the 
one hand, which [could] not be seized . . . under the authority 
of a search warrant . . . and on the other hand, those objects 
which [could] validly be seized including the 
instrumentalities and means by which a crime [was] 
committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen property, 
weapons . . . and [contraband].58 
Possession of so-called “mere evidence”59—items that tend to link an 
individual with a crime but that are not contraband, an instrumentality, or a 
fruit of crime—is perfectly legal.60  Because a search for or seizure of such 
property interferes with the owner’s use and enjoyment of it, Supreme 
Court precedent regarded such acts as per se unreasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.61  Conversely, the Court viewed the 
government to possess “a superior property interest” in illegal subject 
matter like contraband.62  Hence, government searches for or seizures of 
such property were deemed reasonable.63  But absent this requisite superior 
claim of title, the government could not use a search warrant to “gain[] 
access to a man’s house . . . and papers solely for the purpose of making a 
search to secure evidence to be used against him in a . . . proceeding.”64   
Pursuant to the mere evidence rule, virtually “all government attempts 
to procure a person’s private papers were unconstitutional under . . . the 
reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment.”65  This was so because 
with the exception of documents that are the instrumentalities of crime, 
such as “stolen or forged papers,” papers almost always qualify as mere 
evidence.66  Because the government lacks “a superior property interest” in 
documents lawfully in the possession of their owner, it could not search for 
them.67  
During the mere evidence rule’s reign, the Supreme Court confronted 
several statutes authorizing federal agencies to subpoena documents from 
                                                                                                                          
58 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
623 (1886)). 
59 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 349 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd, 116 
U.S. at 623–24). 
60 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). 
61 See id. (stating that the search and seizure of the accused’s property is only valid if possession 
of the property by the accused is unlawful). 
62 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). 
63 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309. 
64 Id. 
65 United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 622 (1886)). 
66 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309 (citing Langdon v. People, 24 N.E. 874, 877 (Ill. 1890)). 
67 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304. 
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parties they were tasked with regulating.  On each occasion, the Court 
condemned the law as an attempt “to direct fishing expeditions into private 
papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime.”68  In 
1886, the Court held in Boyd v. United States69 that “any compulsory 
discovery by . . . compelling the production of [one’s] private books and 
papers . . . is contrary to the principles of a free government . . . and . . . 
obnoxious to the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment.”70 
Twenty years later, in Hale v. Henkel,71 the Court backtracked slightly, 
holding that “an order for the production of books and papers may 
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth 
Amendment.”72  Hale acknowledged that with respect to corporations, 
some documents could be discoverable because a “corporation is a creature 
of the State,” and as a condition of incorporation, the State “reserve[s] [a] 
right . . . to investigate” certain papers to “find out whether [the 
corporation] has exceeded its powers.”73  But the Court adhered to the view 
that “the compulsory extortion of a man’s . . . private papers” generally 
constitutes “an unreasonable search and seizure . . . within the Fourth 
Amendment.”74 
While the Supreme Court would not apply the Fourth Amendment to 
state governments for another half century,75 state courts similarly 
construed their own constitutions to prohibit the forced disclosure of 
private papers, even in civil litigation.76  Reversing a lower court’s finding 
of contempt for a litigant’s refusal to comply with an order to produce 
documents during trial, the California Supreme Court noted: “A man does 
                                                                                                                          
68 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924); accord Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631–32 (1886). 
69 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  
70 Id. at 631–32.  Boyd also rested on a second, now-discredited ground: that the coerced 
production of one’s papers violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination.  Id. at 630.  The Court reasoned that “any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s 
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his 
goods, [was] within the condemnation of [an English] judgment” describing analogous philosophical 
principles.  Id.  The Court concluded that “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each 
other.”  Id.  The Court laid this notion to rest in Andresen v. Maryland, finding that the admission of a 
defendant’s papers against him as evidence did not violate the Fifth Amendment because government 
actors did not compel him to create the papers.  427 U.S. 463, 472–73 (1976). 
71 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
72 Id. at 76 (emphasis added).   
73 Id. at 74–75. 
74 Id. at 71. 
75 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause makes the privacy provisions of the Fourth Amendment applicable to state 
governments). 
76 E.g., McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 159 P.2d 944, 950–51 (Cal. 1945); Ex parte 
Clarke, 58 P. 546, 548 (Cal. 1899); Red Star Lab. Co. v. Pabst, 194 N.E. 734, 735 (Ill. 1935); Carden v. 
Ensminger, 161 N.E. 137, 141 (Ill. 1928); Morrison v. Sturges, 26 How. Pr. 177, 177–78 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1863). 
 1096 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1083 
not lose all his civil rights because he is brought into court as a party to a 
suit.”77 
This precedent gave way in 1967 when the Supreme Court abandoned 
the mere evidence rule in Warden v. Hayden.78  Hayden found that mid-
twentieth-century case law had come to recognize “that the principal object 
of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, 
and ha[d] . . . discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property 
concepts.”79  Consistent with this new conception of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court held that the reasonableness of a search rests not on 
who has “superior” interest in the property sought, but whether the means 
the government uses to acquire it impermissibly intrudes upon privacy.80  
The Court reasoned that “[t]he requirement that the Government 
assert . . . some property interest in material it seizes, has long been a 
fiction, obscuring the reality that government has an interest in solving 
crime.”81  The Court concluded that “[t]he requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment can secure the same protection of privacy whether the search 
is for ‘mere evidence’ or for fruits, instrumentalities or contraband.”82 
The demise of the mere evidence rule led lower courts to conclude that 
Boyd and Hale had been “wounded . . . mortally.”83  Hence, modern courts 
have uniformly held that the FRCP’s coerced document production devices 
do not offend the Constitution.84  This new conception is too clever by half.  
I do not advocate a return to the misguided mere evidence rule.  
                                                                                                                          
77 Ex parte Clarke, 58 P. at 548. 
78 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
79 Id. at 304. 
80 Id. at 304–06. 
81 Id. at 306 (footnote omitted).   
82 Id. at 306–07.  Some commentators have greeted Hayden’s renunciation of the mere evidence 
rule with incredulity.  See Greg S. Sergienko, Self Incrimination and Cryptographic Keys, 2 RICH. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 64 (1996), available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v2i1/sergienko.html (“Warden v. Hayden, 
in which the Supreme Court discerned a “shift in emphasis from property to privacy” in Fourth 
Amendment rights, significantly eroded protection against governmental searches and seizures.” 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304)). 
83 United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 1980); cf. United States v. Sasson, 334 
F. Supp. 2d 347, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Boyd set out the now discredited ‘mere evidence’ rule . . . .”); 
United States v. Braswell, 436 F. Supp. 669, 672 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (“Suffice it to say, this ‘mere 
evidence’ rule . . . has been wholly abrogated by the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
84 See, e.g., Hyster Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183, 184–86 (9th Cir. 1964) (rejecting argument 
that subpoena seeking papers constituted a Fourth Amendment search); Gen. Petrol. Corp. v. Dist. 
Court of the U.S. for Western Dist. of Wash., 213 F.2d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 1954) (finding that 
compliance with FRCP guidelines rendered document production order reasonable for Fourth 
Amendment purposes); Rekeweg v. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431, 437–38 (N.D. Ind. 1961) 
(finding that documents sought were “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence” and defeated the defendant’s assertion that production demand constituted “unreasonable 
search and seizure”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1 F.R.D. 57, 58 (D.N.Y. 1939) (finding 
mere “showing of materiality” by party demanding documents sufficient to render production order 
reasonable under Fourth Amendment), rev’d on other grounds, 334 U.S. 258 (1948). 
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Documents can be evidence of wrongdoing and, as such, the government 
has an interest in obtaining them.  But Hayden’s renunciation of the rule 
was not a rejection of the notion that “an order for the production of books 
and papers may” qualify as a “search . . . within the Fourth Amendment.”85  
The Court simply recognized that the government’s reasonable search of 
private papers is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.86  Unbroken 
precedent—both before and after Hayden—demonstrates that such conduct 
constitutes a search.87 
2.  Individuals Possess a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” in 
Their Private Papers 
The Supreme Court formally abandoned its property-centric view of 
the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States.88  Recognizing that the 
Amendment “protects people, not places,”89 Katz stands for the proposition 
that a search occurs when a government agent intrudes upon “sphere[s] in 
which society recognizes reasonable expectations of privacy.”90  In other 
words, a search ordinarily involves government encroachment on mediums 
that “tend to be the locus of activities that most people like to keep 
secret.”91  Document production demands frequently constitute such an 
intrusion.   
While many documents entail no expectation of privacy and thus 
trigger no Fourth Amendment concerns—letters to the editor, for 
example92—production orders often compel disclosure of private papers 
revealing the writer’s innermost confidences.93  E-mails,94 text messages,95 
                                                                                                                          
85 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). 
86 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 306–07. 
87 See infra Part II.B.2. 
88 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
89 Id. at 351. 
90 United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); accord California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
91 Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1016; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890) (“The common law secures to each individual the right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated 
to others.”).   
92 A writer would not have an expectation of privacy with respect to such a letter because “an 
individual does not have an expectation of privacy in items exposed to the public.”  Filarsky v. Delia, 
132 S. Ct. 1657, 1668 (2012) (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (quoting Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 
1069, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
93 In my view, only the compelled production of “private papers” constitutes a “search” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  While “private papers” elude simple classification, consistent with Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, I would define the term to include all documents in which the writer enjoys 
a reasonable expectation of privacy—e.g., private letters, e-mails, text messages, and diaries.  See 
McKenna, supra note 31, at 55 n.1 (“Those papers having a close relationship to an individual’s 
personality, especially to the private aspects of personality, are clearly ‘private.’”).  It should be noted 
that the standard I advocate would apply with much greater vigor to individuals than to corporations. 
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love letters,96 and even diaries97 are the regular targets of production 
orders.  In the criminal justice arena, precedent recognizes the obvious: It 
is beyond cavil that creators of such media possess a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their contents.98  For this reason, the Fourth 
Amendment expresses a special affinity for private papers, and explicitly 
calls for their protection.99  Precedent recognizes that “[t]he privacy of 
private books and papers is . . . of inestimable value to the owner on 
account of . . . personal and sentimental reasons.”100   
An individual’s papers are “little more than an extension of [her] 
person.”101  Intrusion into “private files” inherently yields “exposure of 
[the writer’s] intimacies and confidences.”102  As such, jurists have long 
recognized that “papers are almost inseparable from the privacy and 
security of the individual.”103  As Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
famously observed, “[t]he principle which protects personal writings” from 
public scrutiny is “that of an inviolate personality.”104  Thus, “the act of 
reading someone’s correspondence” is regarded as a “paradigmatic 
infringement . . . of privacy.”105 
The protection of papers from government scrutiny was historically 
“bound up” with the “struggle for freedom of speech” in England.106  
English authorities frequently sought the private writings of suspected 
dissidents, using “the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system 
                                                                                                                          
94 E.g., Miller v. Citgo Ref. & Chem. Co. LP, No. C-11-22, 2012 WL 113781, at *9–11 (S.D. 
Tex. Jan. 13, 2012); Adelman v. Boy Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 684 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
95 E.g., Flagg v. City of Detroit, 268 F.R.D. 279, 288 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Rodriguez v. City of 
Fresno, Nos. 105CV0661OWWDLB, 105CV01017OWWDLB, 2006 WL 2067063, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 
July 24, 2006). 
96 E.g., Peacock v. Merrill, No. CA 05-0377-BH-C, 2008 WL 176375, at *2 n.4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 
17, 2008); McFarland v. McFarland, 107 A.2d 615, 616–17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954). 
97 See cases cited supra note 23. 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other sealed 
packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy . . . .”); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283–85 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 554 F.3d 769, 771 
(9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages); In re Application of 
U.S. for a Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he diary’s author enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.”); 
United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D.D.C. 1981) (“[P]risoners ‘have and should 
have’ a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a personal diary.” (quoting Diguiseppe v. 
Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d in part, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983))). 
99 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
100 Ex parte Clarke, 58 P. 546, 547 (Cal. 1899).   
101 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
102 State v. Bisaccia, 213 A.2d 185, 192 (N.J. 1965).   
103 Id. at 191. 
104 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 91, at 205.   
105 Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1021. 
106 Marcus v. Search Warrants of Prop., 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961). 
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for the suppression” of dissenters.107  Similarly, it is widely documented 
that well-heeled litigants often file meritless Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation (“SLAPP” suits) to quell dissent.108  Such suits deploy 
the FRCP’s expansive discovery provisions as a weapon to deter “citizens 
from exercising their political rights or to punish them for having done 
so.”109 
Evidence of the preferred status enjoyed by private papers predates the 
Fourth Amendment itself.  Lord Camden recognized the fundamental 
privacy interests implicit in one’s papers in his 1765 opinion, Entick v. 
Carrington.110  The Supreme Court recently characterized Entick as “a 
monument of English freedom undoubtedly familiar to every American 
statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be 
the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law with regard to search 
and seizure.”111  Noting that private papers “are often the dearest property a 
man can have,”112 Entick contended—somewhat hyperbolically—that 
empowering agents of the state to examine “a man’s private letters of 
correspondence, family concerns, [or] trade and business” without showing 
probable cause would be a “monstrous” invasion of personal privacy 
“worse than the Spanish Inquisition.”113   
Yet, the FRCP empowers private litigants to gain access to opponents’ 
and third parties’ private papers with little difficulty.114  Remarkably, the 
public and the courts have accepted this status quo as a fact of modern life.  
When asked whether she kept a diary, then-First Lady Hillary Rodham 
Clinton famously replied, “Heavens no!  It could get subpoenaed.  I can’t 
write anything down.”115  A perusal of precedent shows that Mrs. Clinton’s 
fears were well founded.  “[C]ourts . . . have routinely ordered the 
production of personal diaries in response to requests for production of 
documents.”116   
Federal and state reporters are littered with decisions that casually 
                                                                                                                          
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3–6 (1989) (noting countless SLAPP suits have been filed to exploit the expense and 
emotional distress of civil litigation in order to chill victims and others from speaking out). 
109 Id. at 5–6. 
110 (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P.). 
111 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 
593, 596 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
112 Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817–18. 
113 Id. at 812. 
114 See infra Part III.   
115 Newsmaker: Hillary Rodham Clinton (PBS Newshour television broadcast May 28, 1996), 
transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-june96/hillaryclinton_05-
28.html. 
116 Gill v. Beaver, No. CIV. A. 98-3569, 1999 WL 461821, at *1 (E.D. La. July 2, 1999); see also 
cases cited supra note 23. 
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reveal diary writers’ “most private thoughts and feelings.”117  Examples 
include the discussion of entries concerning “on-and-off relationship[s],”118 
sexual encounters,119 physical assaults,120 stream of conscious 
ruminations,121 “observations and musings” concerning the “perplexing 
transition from adolescence to adulthood,”122 and writers’ supposed “loose 
morals.”123   
Defendants124 and plaintiffs125 alike are subject to this indignity.126  A 
constable pursuing a suspected murderer or rapist enjoys no such access.  
Criminal procedure jurisprudence embraces the obvious: a “diary’s author 
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.”127  As such, the 
police must obtain a warrant before intruding upon such intimacies.128  One 
                                                                                                                          
117 Hawkins v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 07-142-DRH-CJP, 2008 WL 4279994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 
2008). 
118 Quiroz v. Hartgrove Hosp., No. 97 C 6515, 1998 WL 341812, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1998). 
119 Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 
2008); Topol v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
120 Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 361 (D. Colo. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 500 
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). 
121 Zises v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 112 F.R.D. 223, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
122 Simpson, 220 F.R.D. at 361. 
123 Hollingworth v. Hollingworth, 145 P.2d 466, 466–67 (Ore. 1944)  
124 Federal and state courts have compelled defendants to produce their private diaries to opposing 
counsel or the court for inspection.  E.g., Kalima v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. C 06-1503 SI, 
2007 WL 1514785, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2007); Dogan Entrs., Inc. v. Hubsher, No. CV-84-3984, 
1987 WL 20312, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1987); In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 
616, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Chang-Craft v. Cameron, No. 3AN-05-13737, 2006 WL 6886441, at *1 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2006); Robinson v. Robinson, 764 N.Y.S.2d 93, 93–94 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003); Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 741 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370–71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); 
Hollingworth, 145 P.2d at 466–67; King v. Fimia, No. 06-2-00803-1 SEA, 2007 WL 4350387, at *1 
(Wash. Super. Ct. June 5, 2007). 
125 Federal and state courts have compelled plaintiffs to produce their private diaries to opposing 
counsel or the court for inspection.  E.g., Hawkins v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 07-142-DRH-CJP, 2008 WL 
4279994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2008); Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 Cov. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 
126594, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008); Simpson, 220 F.R.D. at 360–62; Gill v. Beaver, No. CIV. A. 
98-3569, 1999 WL 461821, at *1 (E.D. La. July 2, 1999); Quiroz v. Hartgrove Hosp., No. 97 C 6515, 
1998 WL 341812, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1998); Topol v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 
477 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Eidukonis v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 86-5142, 1987 WL 9286, at *2–3 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 9, 1987); Zises, 112 F.R.D. at 224–25. 
126 One might contend that plaintiffs should be treated differently than defendants because, by 
bringing a suit, a plaintiff forfeits some of her privacy rights.  I reject this contention because “the right 
of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the 
government.”  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896–97 (1984).  One should not be compelled to 
forfeit one constitutional right in order to exercise another. 
127 In re Application of U.S. for a Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 
F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 
(D.D.C. 1981) (“[P]risoners ‘have and should have’ a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents 
of a personal diary.” (quoting Diguiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d in 
part, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983))).  
128 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, 10 (1977)). 
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who finds herself on the receiving end of a civil summons or subpoena 
should enjoy the same rights as those suspected of perpetrating crimes.  To 
paraphrase the Bard, a search “by any other name,” is still a search.129 
III.  THE FRCP’S DOCUMENT PRODUCTION RULES DO NOT EMPLOY 
SUFFICIENT RIGOR TO SATISFY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S 
REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT 
That the compulsory production of private papers constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search is, of course, merely the beginning of our inquiry.  The 
Amendment does not bar searches; “it merely prohibits searches . . . that 
are ‘unreasonable.’”130  “Reasonable searches are permitted.”131 
The California Supreme Court squarely addressed the reasonableness 
of civil document production orders in Greyhound Corp. v. Superior 
Court.132  The court acknowledged that the compelled production of 
documents sometimes constitutes a search,133 but concluded that such 
searches are reasonable because modern discovery rules regulate 
production orders in a manner analogous to the issuance of search 
warrants.134  “[J]ust as search warrants are justifiable on the showing of 
good cause,” Greyhound asserted, “so an order for the inspection of 
material in a civil case is reasonable when similar provision is made.”135  
Other courts have accepted this argument.136 
                                                                                                                          
129 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. 
130 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
131 Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 364 P.2d 266, 287 (Cal. 1961), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, Stats. 1963, ch. 1744, § 1 (current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2018.030 (West 
(2012)).  In Greyhound, the defendant sought to avoid compliance with a trial court’s document-
production order, asserting that such orders when made “without reference to its admissibility” 
constitute unreasonable searches and seizures.  Id. at 286.  In support of its argument, the defendant 
relied on California opinions predating Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), recognizing that the 
court-ordered production of private papers constituted unreasonable searches and seizures.  Greyhound, 
364 P.2d at 286 (citing McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 159 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1945)).  
Greyhound overruled these opinions, holding that modern discovery statutes render document-
production orders reasonable per se.  Id. at 286–87.  In an unrelated portion of its opinion, the court 
also rejected the defendant’s contention that documents sought by the plaintiff were protected by the 
work-product doctrine.  Id. at 290–92.  Following the decision, the California Legislature amended one 
of the state’s discovery laws to amplify work-product protections.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 2018.030 (West (2012), noted in Coito v. Superior Court, 278 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2012).  But 
Greyhound’s finding that modern discovery rules render document-production orders immune to 
Fourth Amendment challenges remains good law.  See Coito, 278 P.3d at 864–68 (noting that statutory 
amendments have bolstered the work-product protections recognized by California law, but making no 
reference to Greyhound’s Fourth Amendment holding). 




136 See, e.g., Gen. Petrol. Corp. v. Dist. Court of the U.S. for Western Dist. of Wash., 213 F.2d 
689, 692 (9th Cir. 1954) (finding that compliance with FRCP rendered a document production order 
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The flaw in the Greyhound court’s logic is that the limits imposed by 
the FRCP and state discovery rules do not even remotely compare to those 
imposed by the warrant clause.  Search warrants are not premised on mere 
good cause, but upon a showing of probable cause.137  This standard, 
which has “roots that are deep in our history, represent[s] the accumulated 
wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification 
necessary to make” searches and seizures “reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”138 
The government bears the burden of establishing the existence of 
probable cause.139  The assessment of whether the government has met its 
burden calls for “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence . . . will be found in a particular place.”140  In determining 
whether a search warrant should issue, magistrate judges must 
independently evaluate the evidence offered, probing “the veracity, 
reliability, and basis of knowledge” of its source.141 
In the criminal procedure context, the probable cause requirement 
significantly protects the expectation of privacy inherent in one’s private 
papers.  As one commentator observed: “Requiring a showing of probable 
cause as to the existence of the [individual’s private] papers and their 
evidentiary relationship with a crime would seem to provide almost 
                                                                                                                          
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes); Rekeweg v. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431, 437–38 
(N.D. Ind. 1961) (finding that because the documents sought were “reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence” a defendant’s assertion that a production demand constituted 
“unreasonable search and seizure” was defeated); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1 F.R.D. 57, 
58 (D.N.Y. 1939) (finding a mere “showing of materiality” by the party demanding documents was 
sufficient to render a production order reasonable under the Fourth Amendment), rev’d on other 
grounds, 334 U.S. 258, 264–65 (1948).  But see Carden v. Ensminger, 161 N.E. 137, 141 (Ill. 1928) 
(finding a well-pleaded complaint was insufficient to show probable cause for authorizing a search). 
137 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). 
138 Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959), and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
208 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court has recognized two principal 
exceptions to the rule that probable cause is required to make a search or seizure reasonable: limited, 
protective searches based on reasonable suspicion of imminent danger, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968), and searches incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).  See Eric 
J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 61 
(2010) (“The only exception to the prohibition on searches, absent traditional probable cause, is a very 
narrow and definite one: officer safety.”).  Both Terry and Chimel represent very narrow exceptions 
designed to protect law enforcement officers from attacks from persons the officer reasonably suspects 
to be dangerous.  Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983).  This consideration is wholly 
absent in the context of the compelled production of private papers. 
139 United States v. Andrews, 454 F.3d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 2006). 
140 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
141 United States v. Archibald, 685 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2012); accord United States v. 
McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 
1996).  
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complete protection against the seizure of those papers that ‘constitute an 
integral aspect of a person’s private enclave.’”142 
While probable cause is “a standard well short of absolute 
certainty,”143 it is significantly more stringent than that imposed on civil 
litigants seeking document production orders.  All a litigant needs to do to 
“unlock the doors of discovery” is file a complaint endowed with “well-
pleaded factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 
relief.”144  When this modest obligation is met, Rules 26 and 34 of the 
FRCP direct courts to compel the production of any papers that are 
“relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”145 
The reach of “discovery is not limited to matters that will be 
admissible at trial,”146 but extends to demands that facially appear to be 
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”147  
Importantly, the Federal Rules “do not distinguish between public and 
private information.”148  Further, Rule 26’s requirement of relevancy “is to 
be construed broadly, and material is relevant if it bears on, or reasonably 
could bear on, an issue that is or may be involved [in] the litigation.”149  
The FRCP thus empowers litigants “to obtain—incidentally or 
purposefully—information that not only is irrelevant [to the action] but if 
publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy.”150 
In sharp contrast to “the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge” 
analysis used to seize documentary evidence in the criminal justice 
arena,151 the FRCP requires courts assessing civil document requests to 
“assume [the] veracity” of pleaded accusations.152  It permits no inquiry 
regarding the basis of knowledge underlying a litigant’s factual claims.153  
Allegations premised entirely upon “information and belief” will suffice.154 
                                                                                                                          
142 McKenna, supra note 31, at 74 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 427 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
143 Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007) (per curiam). 
144 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
145 Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Colo. 2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(1)), rev’d on other grounds, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).  In addition, Rule 37 dictates “that 
if . . . a party refuses to obey an order compelling discovery, the court may impose sanctions against 
that individual, including, where appropriate, dismissal of the action.”  Jones v. Niagara Frontier 
Transp. Auth., 836 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)). 
146 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)). 
147 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). 
148 Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35. 
149 Topol v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
150 Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35. 
151 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
152 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
153 Id. at 679.   
154 See, e.g., Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 676 F.3d 318, 327–28 (3d Cir. 
2012) (referring to a lower court’s decision to permit further discovery on information and belief); Tri-
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It is settled law in the criminal arena that accusations made on 
“information and belief” fall far short of satisfying the probable cause 
standard.155  By definition, such allegations do not “state the facts upon 
which the belief is based.”156  As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “[C]ourts 
will not permit the evasion of the Constitution by [issuing warrants] on 
sworn declarations, . . . which fail to establish probable cause, inasmuch as 
they state the facts on information and belief . . . instead of positively 
alleging the material facts.”157  Thus, the basic assumption of Greyhound  
and like opinions that civil discovery rules limit production orders in a 
manner analogous to the issuance of search warrants is fallacious. 
IV.  A PARTY SEEKING TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF PRIVATE PAPERS 
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE 
DOCUMENTS SOUGHT WILL YIELD ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
The expansive discovery permitted by the FRCP and state statutes was 
wholly unknown when the Fourth Amendment was ratified.158  For the first 
century and a half of United States jurisprudence—before the adoption of 
the FRCP in 1938159—“the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-
formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily . . . by the 
pleadings.”160  Courts held fast to the common-law rule that “discovery 
sought upon suspicion, surmise or vague guesses [was] called a fishing 
bill, and [would] be dismissed.”161  Compulsory pre-trial document 
production was barred,162 and to compel the production of a document 
during trial, federal law required the litigant to prove to the court both that 
“the document sought contain[ed] evidence pertinent to [a disputed] 
issue”163 and was “material to the support of the complainant’s own 
case.”164   
                                                                                                                          
Star Theme Builders, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 426 Fed. App’x 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2011) (referring to 
an appellant’s pleadings, made upon information and belief, that allowed for further discovery). 
155 Schencks v. United States, 2 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1924).   
156 Carden v. Ensminger, 161 N.E. 137, 141 (Ill. 1928). 
157 Schencks, 2 F.2d at 187.   
158 See Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911) (finding compelled pre-trial production of 
documents was forbidden prior to FRCP); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: 
The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691–93 (1998) 
(discussing limited reach of pre-FRCP discovery). 
159 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 595 n.14 (2007) (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 
9, at 645). 
160 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947). 
161 Carpenter, 221 U.S. at 540. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 537 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 Id. at 540.  Pursuant to pre-FRCP practice, the production of a document could be compelled 
when “the document sought contain[ed] evidence pertinent to the issue, and in cases and under 
circumstances when they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules or proceeding 
in chancery.”  Id. at 537–38.  The rules of chancery dictated that “a bill must seek only evidence which 
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The power granted to litigants by the FRCP is not only unprecedented 
in U.S. history, but it is also unknown elsewhere in the free world.  “[N]o 
other country—common law or civil law—has any system of discovery 
approaching that provided for in the [FRCP].”165  Around the world, “there 
is widespread disapproval of pretrial discovery of documents as that 
discovery is conducted in U.S. courts.”166  At least fifteen nations have 
enacted “blocking statutes” barring compliance with discovery orders 
issued by American courts.167   
Despite these criticisms, I am not advocating for a return to the pre-
FRCP regime.  Compelled document production, like police-executed 
search warrants, serves the public’s interest in the “determination of 
truth.”168  But the compelled production of private papers and the execution 
of warrants both involve searches.  Thus, I posit that both should be 
brought into alignment with the concept of probable cause—the standard 
that “represent[s] the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as 
to the minimum justification necessary to make” searches and seizures 
“reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”169   
This does not mean the end of the compulsory production of 
documents, but instead merely means the end of the virtually unfettered 
access to an opponent’s private papers currently authorized by the FRCP.  
A litigant seeking discovery of such papers—like a constable seeking a 
search warrant—should bear the burden of establishing that “there is a fair 
probability” that the documents sought will yield admissible evidence.170   
Probable cause, while much more stringent than the criterion for 
disclosure currently imposed by Rule 26, is “a standard well short of 
absolute certainty.”171  In assessing whether a moving party has satisfied 
this burden, the court should assess the “veracity” of his allegations and his 
                                                                                                                          
is material to the support of the complainant’s own case, and prying into the nature of his adversary’s 
case [would] not be tolerated.”  Id. at 540.  While these limitations only applied in federal courts, state 
discovery laws authorizing court-ordered document production were inapplicable in federal court, even 
in diversity cases.  Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 720–25 (1885).  Further, state laws authorizing 
discovery of private papers would not have been subjected to Fourth Amendment scrutiny because the 
Amendment was not applied to the states until 1949.  See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) 
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause makes the provisions of the Fourth 
Amendment applicable to state governments), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 655–57 (1961).   
165 Mullenix, supra note 9, at 6. 
166 Weintraub, supra note 9, at 420 (citing British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1985] 1 A.C. 
58 (H.L.), at 78). 
167 Id.  
168 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976). 
169 Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959), and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
208 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).     
170 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
171 Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007) (per curiam).   
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“basis of knowledge.”172  As with the issuance of search warrants, this does 
not mean that a movant’s allegations “must be seen and weighed . . . in 
terms of library analysis by scholars.”173  Rather, it entails a “totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis, which permits a balanced assessment of the 
relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) 
attending” a movant’s pleaded accusations.174  If the movant’s allegations 
provide the court with a “substantial basis” for concluding that the papers 
sought will yield admissible evidence, then the probable cause standard has 
been satisfied and their production should be compelled.175   
A majority of litigants will be able to satisfy this “flexible standard,”176 
and it should only apply to demands for documents embodying a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”177  But when this standard is 
applicable, it cannot be satisfied by the naked surmise of “information and 
belief” allegations.178   
The application of this standard will strike the proper balance between 
litigants’ interests in the “determination of truth” and the “the protection of 
Fourth Amendment values”179—i.e., the prohibition of “unjustifiable 
intrusion[s] . . . upon the privacy of the individual.”180  Of course, applying 
this standard may shield some unsavory conduct from scrutiny, but that is 
the price of the Fourth Amendment.  “[T]here is nothing new in the 
realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the [wrongdoing] of a 
few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”181 
V.  COURTS SHOULD ISSUE PROTECTIVE ORDERS BARRING THE 
DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE PAPERS PRODUCED  
DURING DISCOVERY TO THE MEDIA 
Following the advent of the FRCP, courts grappled with the question 
of whether the First Amendment commands that information obtained 
through discovery be available to the media for publication.182  After nearly 
                                                                                                                          
172 Gates, 462 U.S. at 233.   
173 Id. at 231–32 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).   
174 Id. at 234.   
175 Id. at 239.   
176 Id.   
177 See supra text accompanying note 90.   
178 See cases cited supra note 38. 
179 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).   
180 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); accord 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 n.10 (1972) (quoting Justice Brandeis’s text approvingly).   
181 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (White, J., concurring).   
182 Compare In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 182–83, 196–97 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that the First 
Amendment barred the court from issuing a protective order preventing media disclosure of materials 
received in discovery process), with Nichols v. Phila. Tribune Co., 22 F.R.D. 89, 92 (E.D. Pa. 1958) 
(permitting plaintiff to file documents under seal).     
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a half century of tumult, the Supreme Court resolved this question in 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.183 Concluding that “discovery may 
seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties,” the 
Court held that the Constitution permits courts to issue protective orders 
prohibiting parties from publicly disseminating information obtained in 
discovery.184   
The Court reasoned that discovery “is provided for the sole purpose of 
assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated 
disputes.”185  Despite this limited purpose, the Court recognized that 
modern discovery mechanisms can be easily abused.  The FRCP empowers 
“litigants to obtain—incidentally or purposefully—information that not 
only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation 
and privacy.  The government clearly has a substantial interest in 
preventing this sort of abuse of its processes.”186  For this reason, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced 
production of information under a . . . discovery rule is sufficient 
justification for the authorization of protective orders.”187  
Despite the clarity of the Seattle Times ruling, few lower courts seem 
to have taken notice.188  Several courts continue to recognize a 
“presumption that discovery materials are open to public inspection,” 
permitting dissemination of such information to the media.189  
Furthermore, significant lower court case law “suggests that even when a 
party admittedly seeks [to use information obtained during discovery] to 
publicly embarrass his opponent, no protection should issue absent 
evidence of substantial embarrassment or harm.”190   
This precedent not only ignores Seattle Times, but it does not accord 
with the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  In Wilson v. 
Layne,191 the Court addressed whether the First Amendment empowers 
police to invite media representatives to accompany them while they 
execute search warrants.192  In Wilson, police invited a Washington Post 
                                                                                                                          
183 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
184 Id. at 34–37. 
185 Id. at 34.   
186 Id. at 35.      
187 Id. at 35–36.  
188 See Cooper, supra note 16, at 776 (“Seattle Times has been sometimes sidestepped, 
occasionally ignored, and often overwhelmed by the rigorous good cause findings required by lower 
federal court decisions.” (footnotes omitted)).   
189 Flaherty v. Seroussi, 209 F.R.D. 295, 297–99 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); accord Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 
F.R.D. 29, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hawley v. Hall, 131 F.R.D. 578, 581 (D. Nev. 1990). 
190 Burgess v. Town of Wallingford, No. 3:11-CV-1129 (CSH), 2012 WL 4344194, at *11 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 21, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Pia v. Supernova Media, Inc., 275 
F.R.D. 559, 561–62 (D. Utah 2011); Flaherty, 209 F.R.D. at 299; Hawley, 131 F.R.D. at 584–85. 
191 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 
192 Id. at 612–13. 
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reporter and photographer to accompany them during the execution of a 
warrant to arrest the petitioners’ son and search their home.193  Because the 
officers possessed a warrant, the Court noted that “they were undoubtedly 
entitled to enter [the petitioners’] home . . . . But it does not necessarily 
follow that they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a 
photographer with them.”194  The execution of warrants necessarily entail a 
significant invasion of privacy.   “Valid warrants will issue to search the 
innocent, and [such] people . . . unfortunately bear the cost.  Officers 
executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are 
engaged in private activity; and the resulting frustration, embarrassment, 
and humiliation may be real . . . .”195 
The Wilson Court reasoned that officers may not unnecessarily 
magnify this humiliation by exposing private information to the media.196 
The Fourth Amendment “require[s] that police actions in execution of a 
warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.”197  The 
reporters and photographers did not meet this limitation, as their presence 
was not related to the warrant: “[T]he reporters did not engage in the 
execution of the warrant, and did not assist the police in their task.  The 
reporters therefore were not present for any reason related to the 
justification for police entry into the home . . . .”198  The Court concluded: 
[I]t is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to 
bring members of the media or other third parties into a home 
during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the 
third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of 
the warrant.199 
Wilson provides instruction with respect to civil document production 
orders.  Both the execution of search warrants and the compelled 
production of private papers involve the exposure of “private activity” 
threatening significant “frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation.”200  
Such embarrassment—when based on a showing of probable cause—may 
be outweighed by “the public interest in determination of truth at trial.”201  
But as both Wilson and Seattle Times recognize, the humiliation resulting 
from such intrusions should not be magnified by allowing unnecessary 
                                                                                                                          
193 Id. at 606–07. 
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201 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976). 
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third parties to view this material.202 
Of course, the First Amendment requires that private papers actually 
received into evidence be made available to the public.203  This does not 
make the contents of private papers produced in discovery presumptively 
public.  The purpose of discovery is to assist “in the preparation and trial, 
or the settlement, of litigated disputes.”204  A litigant’s use of this 
information, like an officer’s execution of a warrant, should be restricted 
“to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.”205 
The Fourth Amendment bars police from bringing third parties with 
them during the execution of warrants unless those parties are needed to 
“assist the police in their task.”206  For the same reason, courts should issue 
protective orders limiting disclosure of the contents of private papers 
received in discovery to third parties who assist litigants or counsel in their 
task. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Since their advent in 1938, the FRCP’s expansive discovery provisions 
have fundamentally transformed civil litigation.  Gone are the days of 
dramatic courtroom triumphs.  For the modern litigator, “victory is not in 
the scathing cross [examination], but in the tedious review of 
documents.”207  The battle for documents “is the numbing, ditch-digging 
work that determines the winner.”208 
Discovery serves the public’s interest in arriving at the truth.  But the 
expansive power to compel the production of private papers that the FRCP 
conveys enables litigants to intrude into “sphere[s] in which society 
recognizes reasonable expectations of privacy.”209  Under this standard, 
nothing is sacred, and no detail is too intimate to shield it from scrutiny. 
The compelled production of private papers constitutes a quintessential 
Fourth Amendment search.  Yet, the FRCP bestows upon civil litigants the 
power to compel disclosure of such documents virtually as a matter of 
right.  I do not contend that compelled document production should be 
wholly eliminated.  While the disclosure of private papers necessarily 
                                                                                                                          
202 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–14; Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35.   
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threatens significant “frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation,” the 
same intrusions attend the execution of search warrants.210  I simply assert 
that like search warrants, orders compelling the production of private 
papers should be premised on a threshold showing of probable cause.  The 
failure to apply this standard to invasions of privacy outside the realm of 
criminal procedure gives parties “more leeway” to litigate often trivial 
personal matters than it gives the government to “enforc[e] laws against 
rape or murder.”211   
While probable cause is much more stringent than the bar for 
disclosure currently imposed by the FRCP, it is “a standard well short of 
absolute certainty.”212  If the moving party’s pleaded allegations 
demonstrate that “there is a fair probability” that the papers sought will 
yield admissible evidence, then the probable cause standard has been 
satisfied and their production should be compelled.213  A majority of 
litigants will be able to satisfy this “flexible, easily applied standard.”214  
But its application will thwart many of the “fishing expeditions” currently 
permitted by the FRCP.215   
The Supreme Court itself promulgated the FRCP.  Thus, acceptance of 
my argument requires the Court to do something it has never done before: 
acknowledge that its own actions violated the Constitution.216  “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.”217  With this charge comes the responsibility to exercise the 
humility and detachment necessary to recognize that it, like its coordinate 
branches of government, is not infallible.  I can think of no greater 
endorsement of America’s tripartite system of government than a Supreme 
Court decision recognizing this fact.218 
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